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CASE COMMENTS
STATE UNIVERSITY ADMISSION POLICY BARRING MALES FROM
NURSING SCHOOL VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982)
In Mississipi Universiy for Women v. Hogan,' the United States
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of permissible,2 benign,3 gender-
based classifications4 by holding that an all-women's state university5
1. 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
2. Statutory and administrative classifications that are alleged to violate the equal protec-
tion clause are reviewed under one of three judicially created standards of scrutiny: the rational
relationship test, which requires only that the classification be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective, see infra note 23; the intermediate or heightened standard of review, re-
served for gender-based classifications, under which a classification will be found constitutional if
it bears a substantial relationship to an important governmental objective, see infra note 64 and
accompanying text; and the strict scrutiny test, which requires that the classification be necessary
to fulfill a compelling governmental purpose, see infra note 23.
3. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's acknowledgement of the history of societal dis-
crimination against women, see infra note 43 and accompanying text.
The terms "benign," "remedial," or "compensatory" refer to policies allegedly designed to pro-
vide some form of redress for women for past discrimination. The Court has yet to find that men
as a class have been subject to discrimination because of their sex. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 212 n.1 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[mien as a class have not been the victims of the
kind of historic, pervasive discrimination that has disadvantaged other groups."); id at 219 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) ("[tjhere is no suggestion in the Court's opinion that males in this age group
are in any way peculiarly disadvantaged, subject to systematic discriminatory treatment, or other-
wise in need of special solicitude from the courts."); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 360 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[wihile doubtless some widowers are in financial need, no one suggests
that such need resulted from sex discrimination as in the case of widows"). Cf. Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973) (discussing the "long and unfortunate" history of discrimina-
tion against women). But see Kanowitz, "Benign" Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their
Cure, 31 HASTINrs L.J. 1379, 1388 (1980) ("[tlhe Justices' most serious error has been their failure
to appreciate the extent of the societal and legal discrimination that males have suffered because
of their sex ....").
This does not mean, of course, that men cannot be the subjects of unlawful discrimination. See,
e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979) (state statute imposing alimony obligations on husband
but not wife violates the equal protection clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) (classification establishing a higher drinking age for men than women "is
objectionable because it is based on an accident of birth, because it is a mere remnant of the now
almost universally rejected tradition of discriminating against males in this age bracket....").
4. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of gender-neutral classifications that have a dis-
proportionate impact on women, see infra note 94.
5. See infra note 8. In 1971 there were 347 single-sex schools in the United States, account-
ing for approximately .3% of the number of students enrolled in higher education. Sixteen of
these were public, eleven of which were all-male. In the private sector, 143 schools were all-male
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which excluded qualified males from its nursing school solely on the
basis of sex violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Respondent, a male registered nurse, sought admission' to the Mis-
and 188 were all-female. In 1976, the number of single-sex colleges decreased to 249, representing
nine percent of all higher education facilities. Of this total, only nine were public: seven were all-
male; two were all-female. Four of these nine were federal military academies which soon there-
after began admitting women. V. GRANT & C. LIND, DIGEST OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS,
1977-1978, at 102-03 (1978). See also Moody, The Constitution andthe One Sex College, 20 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 465, 467 n.14 (1971).
At the time the present case was before the Court, there were only two remaining single-sex
public colleges; one of them, presumably, was Mississippi University for Women (MUW), OF-
FICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT OF EDUCATION, DATA OF EARNED DEGREES CONFERRED BY
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION BY RACE, ETHNICITY AND SEX, ACADEMIC YEAR 1976-77,
at 36, 72 (1980).
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I. The fourteenth amendment states in pertinent part: "[N]o
State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." See
infra note 23 and accompanying text.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits only that discrimination for
which a state may be said to be responsible. Blum v. Yaretsky, 102 S. Ct. 2777,2786 (1982); Shelly
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). The concept of state action was initially given a narrow con-
struction by the Supreme Court. See, eg., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); United States v. Cruickshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875). It is now well established that private action may constitute state action if
there is "significant" overt or covert public involvement or encouragement, state coercion, or the
exercise of powers traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. Blum v. Yaretsky, 102 S. Ct.
at 2786; Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-61 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 353, 357 (1974). The mere fact that an entity is subject to state regulation does not
by itself convert private action to state action, id at 350, nor does mere approval or acquiescence
in the initiative of a private party. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 164-65. See also Rendell-
Baker v. Kahn, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982). See generally G. GUNTHER, TEXT AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 206-15, 978-1028 (1980 & Supp. 1982).
The Mississippi University for Women is a "public" school because it is an educational institu-
tion operated by the state. See Comment, Plessy Revived" The Separate But Equal Doctrine and
Sex-Segregated Education, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585, 586 n.8 (1977). Therefore, the ac-
tions of the University fall within the state action concept.
For an analysis of the state action concept as it relates to gender and racial discrimination
claims, see Ginsburg, Women as Full Members of the Club: An Evolving American Ideal, 6 HUM.
RTS. 2, 6-14 (1976). For an extensive analysis of the impact of the fourteenth amendment and
numerous federal laws on private universities and colleges, see O'Neil, Private Universities and
Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155 (1969-70).
7. The present case grew out of Hogan's second attempt for admission to MUW. In August
1976, he telephoned the University to inquire about enrollment in the nursing school but was
advised that his application would be rejected because of his sex. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Ho-
gan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982) (available February 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file)
[hereinafter cited as Petition for Writ of Certiorari]; see infra note 12.
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sissippi University for Women' (MUW) baccalaureate program in
nursing.9 He chose not to apply to nursing programs at two less conve-
8, MUW is the only single-sex state-supported college or university in Mississippi. 102 S.
Ct. at 3334 n.l. There are 7 other state-supported universities and 16 public junior colleges within
the state, all coeducational. Id at 3342 (Powell, J., dissenting).
MUW was originally incorporated by the state in 1884 as the Mississippi Industrial Institute
and College for the Education of White Girls of the State of Mississippi. 1884 Miss. LAWS ch.
XXX, § 1. The name was changed to the Mississippi State College for Women, 1920 Miss. LAWS
ch. 256, and finally to its current name, Mississippi University for Women, 1974 Miss. LAWS ch.
367 § 2 (codified as amended at Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-117-1 (Supp. 1981)). MUW is the oldest
state-supported all-women's college in the United States and has admitted only women since its
establishment. 102 S. Ct. at 3334.
The charter of MUW currently in force provides:
The purpose and aim of the Mississippi State College for Women is the moral and
intellectual advancement of the girls of the state by the maintenance of a first-class insti-
tution for their education in the arts and sciences, for their training in normal school
methods and kindergarten, for their instruction in bookkeeping, photography, stenogra-
phy, telegraphy, and typewriting, and in designing, drawing, engraving, and painting,
and their industrial application, and for their instruction in fancy, general, and practical
needlework, and in such other industrial branches as experience, from time to time, shall
suggest as necessary or proper to fit them for the practical affairs of life.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-117-3 (1972). The wording of the charter has changed very little since the
University's inception. The last part of the charter originally read:
and, also, a knowledge of bookkeeping, with such other practical industries as, from time
to time, to them may be suggested by experience, or tend to promote the general object
of said Institute and College, to wit: fitting and preparing such girls for the practical
industries of the age.
1884 Miss. LAWS ch. XXX § 6. Cf. 102 S. Ct. at 3341 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("One only states
the obvious when he observes that the University long ago should have replaced its original state-
ment of purpose and brought its corporate papers into the 20th century.").
Justice O'Connor, briefly reviewing the history of women's education in Mississippi, concluded
that MUW was founded to provide white women some form of higher education, but not one
superior or even equivalent to that provided white men, and to some degree, black men and
women. 102 S. Ct. at 3338 n.13.
9. Although respondent already was a registered nurse, he claimed that with a baccalaure-
ate degree he would be able to earn a higher salary and would be eligible for more advanced
training. 102 S. Ct. at 3334 n.3. See infra note 10.
MUW's School of Nursing was established in 1971 and initially offered only a two-year associ-
ate degree. 102 S. Ct. at 3334. In 1974 MUW began offering a four-year baccalaureate program
in nursing. Id See supra note 7; infra note 12 and accompanying text. The School of Nursing
maintains its own faculty and administration apart from the rest of MUW, and establishes its own
admissions criteria. 102 S. Ct. at 3334 (citing 1980-1981 BULLETIN OF MISSISSIPPI UNrvERsrIr
FOR WOMEN 31-34, 212-229).
Although MUW prohibited males from enrolling in degree-granting programs, it permitted
men to audit day or evening classes and participate fully in class. 102 S. Ct. at 3334 n.4, 3340.
Additionally, both men and women could enroll in continuing education courses offered by the
School of Nursing. Id at 3340. Based upon information available in the record, Justice Powell
found that men had audited 138 courses over the last 10 years. Id at 3347 n.17 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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niently located state-supported coeducational institutions.' 0 Although
otherwise fully qualified, 1 respondent was denied admission to the
program solely on the basis of his sex.' 2 He subsequently brought suit
against the university seeking injunctive relief t3 and a judgment declar-
ing that the admissions policy excluding males14 violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 5 The district court,
10. Nursing programs leading to a bachelor's degree are offered at the University of Southern
Mississippi in Hattiesburg, which is 178 miles from Columbus, where respondent lives and MUW
is located, and at the University of Mississippi in Jackson, 147 miles from Columbus. 102 S. Ct. at
3342 n.l (Powell, J., dissenting). Hogan alleged that attending either of these coeducational facili-
ties would require him to abandon his current employment and move his family, resulting in
extreme financial and personal hardship. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7. In an
amicus brief filed in the case, it was also pointed out that women in Hogan's position, employed in
the nursing profession and seeking to attend school contemporaneously, would be at a distinct
advantage: By attending MUW while working, they would gain experience, seniority, and a
higher wage which Hogan would have to forego by attending one of the coeducational nursing
programs. BriefAmicii Curiae, National Woman's Law Center, NOW Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, Woman's Equity Action League, and Women's Legal Defense Fund, Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982) (available February 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Briefs file).
Justice Powell's dissent focused solely on the inconvenience respondent would suffer by being
required to travel to either coeducational facility. 102 S. Ct. 3345 & n. II (Powell, J., dissenting).
Rut see id at 3336 n.8.
11. 102 S. Ct. at 3334. The parties stipulated that respondent was qualified for admission.
Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982) (available August
28, 1982 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) [hereinafter cited as Brief in Opposition to Petition
for Writ].
Respondent's qualifications included a Licensed Practical Nurse Certificate (LPN), an Associate
of Applied Science Degree (RN), and nine years of work experience in the nursing profession.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7.
12. 102 S. Ct. at 3334. Respondent was notified by letter on September 19, 1979, six days
after he applied, that he had been denied admission because MUW restricts its enrollment to
females. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7.
13. The preliminary injunction would have compelled Hogan's admission for the Spring
1981 semester. Hogan's complaint also requested compensatory damages of $25,000 and attor-
ney's fees. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7.
14. See supra note 9.
15. See supra note 6; infra note 23 and accompanying text. Respondent's complaint also
alleged a violation of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 § 901(a), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 901(a) states, in part: "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .. " Section 901(a) is limited to "institutions of vocational education, professional
education and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher edu-
cation." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
For a general discussion of the scope of the education amendments and legislative history, see
Buck & Orleans, Sex Discrimination-A Bar to Democratic Education: An Overview of Tile IX of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/6
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employing the rational relationship test, 16 entered summary judgment
in favor of the state.17 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, em-
ploying an intermediate standard of scrutiny, found the university's
policy unconstitutional,'I and reversed.' 9 The United States Supreme
the Education Amendments 1972, 6 CONN. L. REv. 1(1973); Todd, Title 1X of the 1972 Education
.4mendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public Schools, 53 TEX. L. REv. 103 (1974).
Respondent abandoned his claim for relief under Title IX prior to the district court hearing on
the preliminary injunction. Hogan v. Mississippi Univ. for Women, No. EC 80-169-LS-P (N.D.
Miss. Dec. 23, 1980) (available August 28, 1982 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file); amended
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7.
MUW relied on subsequent provisions of Title IX to support the validity of the single-sex ad-
missions policy. See infra notes 18 & 171-79 and accompanying text.
16. Hogan v. Mississippi Univ. for Women, No. EC 80-169-LS-P (N.D. Miss. Dec. 23, 1980).
The rational relationship test invokes the minimum degree of scrutiny under equal protection
analysis; it requires only that the means employed by the state be rationally related to a legitimate
objective. See supra note 2; infra note 23 and accompanying text.
The district court stated the test as follows:
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require "identity
of treatment" for all citizens, or preclude a state, by legislation, from making classifica-
tions and creating differences in the rights of different groups. It is only when the dis-
criminatory treatment and varying standards, as created by the legislature or
administrative classification are arbitrary and wanting in any rational justification that
they offend the Equal Protection Clause.
Id (emphasis added).
Relying heavily on the Third Circuit's reasoning in Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880
(3d Cir. 1976) (maintenance by the state of a limited number of separate but equal single-sex
public high schools in which enrollment is voluntary does not violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment), afl'dmem, 430 U.S. 703 (1977), and Williams v. McNair, 316 F.
Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970) (state-supported all-women's college does not violate equal protection
clause where state-supported all-men's college and a wide range of state-supported coeducational
institutions exist), aff'dmem, 401 U.S. 951 (1971), the district court found that the state's objective
of providing "the greatest practical range of educational learning to females" was not arbitrary.
Hogan v. Mississippi Univ. for Women, No. EC 80-169-LS-P (N.D. Miss. Dec. 23, 1980).
Plaintiff-respondent first appealed the order granting summary judgment, and subsequently ap-
pealed the order denying a preliminary injunction. The appeals were consolidated by the court of
appeals, which also granted MUW's motion for an expedited appeal. Brief for Respondent, Mis-
sissippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982) (available February 1, 1982, on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Briefs file).
17. The defendants included the members of the Mississippi Board of Trustees of State Insti-
tutions of Higher Learning, who were responsible for establishing policy at all institutions in the
state system of higher education; the President of MUW, who had general supervision over admis-
sions policies; and the Director of Admissions for MUW, who was charged with administration of
admissions policies. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7.
18. 646 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1981), aft'd, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982). The Fifth Circuit,
relying on Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981), applied the standard developed in Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), which requires that gender-based classifications be substantially re-
lated to important governmental interests. 646 F.2d at 1117-18. See infra notes 61-67 and accom-
panying text. Although the state interest in providing women with educational opportunities was
important, if not compelling, the Fifth Circuit stated that "[the] interest does not stop with female
citizens." 646 F.2d at 1118. Given the importance of education, the court held that "providing a
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Court granted certiorari,2" affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit,
and held: A state university's admissions policy that excludes males
from a nursing program 2 that leads to opportunities from which wo-
men historically have not been barred violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.22
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 23 has been
unique educational opportunity for females but not for males . . . does not bear a substantial
relationship to this important objective." Id at 1119.
The Fifth Circuit vacated the summary judgment dismissing Hogan's declaratory and compen-
satory relief and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. Id at 1120.
MUW also contended, on rehearing, that § 901(a)(5) of Title IX ofthe Educational Amendment
Acts of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (1976), provided a specific exception to the Title's general
prohibition against sex discrimination in institutions of higher education. Section 901(a)(5) states:
(5) in regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any public institution of un-
dergraduate higher education which is an institution that traditionally and continu-
ally from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students of one sex
Id See supra note 15.
The Fifth Circuit, without reference to precedent, held that section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, under which Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 was passed, does not author-
ize Congress to allow states to maintain programs that violate other constitutional provisions.
Hogan v. Mississippi Univ. for Women, 653 F.2d 222, 223 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), a'd, 102
S. Ct. 3331 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 121-27 for the Supreme Court's treatment
of this question.
19. 646 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
20. 102 S. Ct. 501 (1981).
21. For a discussion of an application of this holding to programs other than nursing, see
infra note 128 and accompanying text.
22. The Court also held that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment did not authorize the mainte-
nance of MUW's exclusionary admissions policy. See infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
The federal government is similarly barred by the equal protection component of the fifth
amendment from adopting exclusionary policies. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2650
n.3 (1981); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See generally Karst, The
Ffth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REv. 541 (1977).
23. The fourteenth amendment, ratified in 1868, and its companion post-Civil War amend-
ments were originally intended to protect the newly freed slaves from anticipated racial discrimi-
nation. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Frank & Munro, The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection ofthe Laws'; 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421. Until the 1960s, equal
protection played a very modest role in constitutional litigation. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
208 (1927) (referring to equal protection as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments").
With the exception of gender-based classifications, which are now examined under an intermedi-
ate degree of scrutiny, see in/ta notes 61-67 and accompanying text, equal protection analysis
today is divided into two sharply differing "tiers" of analysis. The bottom tier, the "old" or
traditional equal protection tier, focuses solely on legislative means, not on legislative objectives.
It merely requires that the statutory classification be "rationally related" to the legislative purpose,
and is traditionally invoked to challenge social and economic legislation. See, e.g., Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (state law banning retail sale of milk in plastic
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held to prohibit states from adopting any classification that unlawfully
nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers rationally related to state's asserted statutory purposes of
encouraging the use of environmentally superior containers, reducing economic dislocation, con-
serving energy and easing solid waste problems); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
US. 166 (1980) (federal law providing for system of retirement and disability benefits that gives
windfall to persons who qualify for social security retirement benefits not a patently arbitrary or
irrational way to achieve governmental interest in fiscal integrity of system); Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (statute mandating retirement at age 50 for all uni-
formed state police officers rationally related to the state's objective of protecting the public by
assuring the physical preparedness of uniformed officers); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972) (state decision to provide lower welfare benefits to AFDC recipients than to the aged or
infirm not invidious or arbitrary); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (state regulation
imposing a ceiling on welfare benefits to AFDC families regardless of size or need rationally
supportable and furthers the legitimate state interest in encouraging employment and maintaining
equity between welfare and poor working families); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)
(state laws prohibiting or restricting time, place, and manner of Sunday sale of specific items not
without rational and substantial relation to the objects of the legislation); Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (city ordinance prohibiting use of advertisement on all except
business delivery vehicles related to intended purpose).
For a brief discussion of the myriad formulations of the minimal scrutiny test and the judicial
deference to legislative determination they reflect, see infra note 30. For a classic analysis of the
requisite relationship between means and ends required by the traditional equal protection stan-
dard, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
At the other end of the equal protection spectrum is the "strict scrutiny" standard, which fo-
cuses on ends as well as means. It requires that the classification be necessary to achieve a com-
pelling governmental interest. This strict scrutiny applies in two situations: where the law or
practice classifies on the basis of a suspect class, such as race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), national origin, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973);
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), or
alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and where a fundamental right explicitly or
implicitly found in the Constitution is implicated, such as voting, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), appellate review,
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), reproductive
freedom, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), or access to state civil courts, Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
To date the Court has declined to apply strict scrutiny in a number of contexts. See, e.g., Mills
v. Habluetzel, 102 S. Ct. 1549 (1982) (continuing to apply a standard of review greater than ration-
ality to classifications based on illegitimacy); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (mental
illness); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age); San Antonio In-
dep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education recognized by the Court as "impor-
tant," but not fundamental); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ("necessities").
A plurality of the Court concluded sex should be a suspect class in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973). See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text. A majority of the Court has never
adopted this position. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975) (unnecessary to decide if
gender is suspect class as classification fails to meet standard set down in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971)). See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); G. GUNTHER, supra note 4,
at 745-64, 908-68; Baker, Neutrality, Process and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Pro-
tection, 58 TEx. L. REv. 1029 (1980); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword" In
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discriminates among persons 4 on the basis of sex.2" The constitutional
standard for evaluating the legality of a gender-based classification,
however, has been subject to unclear and inconsistent application by
the Supreme Court.26
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword" Equal Citizenshi
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of
Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral and Permissive Classficatlon,
62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); Shaman, The Rule ofReasonableness in ConstitutionalAdjudication: To-
wardtheEndofIrresponsible JudicialReview andthe Establishment of a Viable Theory of the Equal
Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153 (1975); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal
Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
Despite the apparent clarity of such an analytical scheme, the two-tiered analysis has produced
considerable confusion. As one commentator wrote, "[d]espite a continuing stream of court opin-
ions and academic commentary, equal protection doctrine remains in a state of disarray. Justices
bemoan that the most contested judicial rubrics are not guides to decision, but uninformative
labels, used sometimes to state conclusions but never to aid analysis." Baker, supra, at 1029. See
Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188 (1979) (Blackmun, J,,
concurring) (observing "the unrelieved discomfort with what seems to be a continuing tendency in
this Court to use as tests such easy phrases as 'compelling state interest' and 'least drastic [or
restrictive] means.' "); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
("There are valid reasons for dissatisfaction with the two-tier approach that has been prominent in
the Court's decisions in the decade"). This dissatisfaction has driven a number of Justices to
search for new articulations of an equal protection standard. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
212-13 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("there is only one Equal Protection Clause .... It does
not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in
other cases."); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (classifications alleged to violate the equal protection clause are scrutinized under a
"spectrum of standards," depending on the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to class members of the benefits denied and the asserted state interests); Weber v,
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972) (blurring the distinctions between strict
and minimal scrutiny precedents by postulating an "overreaching" approach to all equal protec-
tion cases). See also Gunther, supra, at 17-20.
24. The equal protection clause by its terms applies to all "persons." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § I. See supra note 6. The Court has construed persons to include aliens and corporations,
in addition to citizens. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (aliens); Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (corporations).
25. "Gender has never been rejected as an impermissible classification in all instances."
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 n.10 (1974). See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S.
464 (1981) (upholding California's statutory rape law penalizing only men); Parham v. Hughes,
441 U.S. 347 (1979) (rejecting challenge to state law denying father the right to sue for death of his
illegitimate child); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 312 (1977) (upholding provision of Social Secur-
ity Act providing advantage for women in computation of benefits). Cf. General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (exclusion of pregnancy related disabilities in private disability plan
does not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
(exclusion of pregnancy disabilities from state insurance system not unconstitutional discrimina-
tion between pregnant women and nonpregnant persons).
26. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981) ("[a]s is evident from our
opinions, the Court has had some difficulty in agreeing upon the proper approach and analysis in
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Prior to 197127 the Supreme Court rejected nearly all equal protec-
tion challenges to statutory schemes alleged to discriminate on the basis
of sex28 by applying the traditional minimal scrutiny standard normally
reserved for social and economic legislation.29 Under this deferential
eases involving challenges to gender-based classifications."); Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306,
1309 (1980) (Brennan, Circuit Justice) ("[i]n the past, the standard of review to be applied in
gender-based discrimination cases has been a subject of considerable debate"); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[a]s is evident from our opinions, the Court
has had difficulty in agreeing upon a standard of equal protection analysis that can be applied
consistently to the wide variety of legislative classifications"); Vorcheimer v. School Dist., 400 F.
Supp. 326, 340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("[a] lower court faced with this line of cases has an uncomfort-
able feeling, somewhat similar to a man playing a shell game who is not absolutely sure there is a
pea").
See generally Blattner, The Supreme Court's "'Intermediate" Equal Protection Decisions: Five
Inperfect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1981); Cassen, Equal
Protection-Equal Status: A Summary of Sex Discrimination Cases Since Frontiero, 11 LINCOLN
L. REv. 167 (1980); Ginsburg, From No Rights, to Half Rights, to Confusing Rights, 7 HUM. RTs.
12 (1978); Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 Sup. CT. REV.
1; Goldstein, The Constitutional Status of Women: The Burger Court and the Sexual Revolution in
American Law, 3 LAw & PoL'Y Q. 5 (1981); Note, The Search for a Standard of Review in Sex
Discrimination Questions, 14 Hous. L. REv. 721 (1977).
27. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (state law automatically exempting women
from jury service upheld); Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (state statute permitting women
to serve as bartenders only if their husband or father owned the bar upheld); West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (statute providing minimum wage for women upheld); Radice v. New
York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (statute limiting the hours of night work for women in restaurants in
cities with particular populations upheld); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) (state statute
limiting the hours of women nurses and pharmacists upheld); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 691
(1914) (statute limiting the number of hours women could work upheld); Mueller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) (statute limiting hours a woman could be employed in factories upheld); Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (denial of right to vote to women before nineteenth
amendment upheld); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding state law deny-
ing women the right to practice law). But cf. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 231 U.S. 525 (1923)
(law prescribing minimum wage for women struck down as interference with fifth amendment
liberty of contract).
See generally L. GOLDSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN 6-77 (1979); H. KAY,
SEx BASED DISCRIMINATION 2-11 (1981 ed.); L. KANOWTZ, supra note 3, at 150-54; Brown,
Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal
Rights, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 876-82 (1971); Erickson, Women and the Supreme Court: Anatomy is
Destiny, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 209, 214-21 (1974); Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Four-
teenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 161, 161-64; Ginsburg, Gender and the
Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 2-8 (1975); Goldstein, supra note 26, at 6-8; Note, Regulations
of Conditions of Employment of Women: A Critique of Muller v. Oregon, 13 B.U.L. REv. 276, 276-
80 (1933); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amend-
mentZ 84 HARv. L. REv. 1499, 1502-04 (1971); Comment, Sexual Equality: Notfor Women Only,
29 CATH. U.L. REv. 427, 428-30 (1980).
29. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
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standard, an allegedly discriminatory statute is presumptively constitu-
tional and will be struck down only upon a showing that the classifica-
tion bears no "rational relationship" to a legitimate government
interest.3°
Reed v. Reed, 31 however, marked a significant shift in the Court's
attitude toward gender-based classifications. 32  In Reed, a unanimous
Court33 struck down an Idaho statute imposing a mandatory preference
for men over similarly situated women as administrators of intestate
30. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 (1981). See supra note 23.
The Court has formulated the minimum scrutiny test in different ways in order to reflect varying
degrees of deference to be accorded the legislative branch. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S.
314, 331 (1981) ("[s]ocial and economic legislation. . . must be upheld against equal protection
attack when the legislative means are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.');
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 (1980) ("[tlhe only. . . question is
whether Congress achieved its purpose in a patently arbitrary or irrational way"); McDonald v.
Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) ("[t]he distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must
bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside ... only if based on
reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of that goal"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-
26 (1961) ("[tlhe constitutional safeguard is only offended if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective."); Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("some reasonable differentiation fairly
related to the object of regulation"); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)
("[the means selected shall have a] fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation");
Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) ("the 14th Amendment avoids
what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary").
In addition to disagreement over the degree of deference afforded the legislature in suiting
means to ends, the members of the Court hold divergent views on the clarity with which the
legislative purpose must appear. G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 101 n.1 (Supp. 1982). Conpare
Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668 (1981) (Brennan, J.) (the
Court will assume the objectives articulated by the legislature are the actual purposes of the stat-
ute unless proven otherwise) and Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7
(1981) (same) with United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (Rehn-
quist, J.) (Court does not require the legislature to articulate the reasons underlying the enactment
of a statute; the reasons are "constitutionally irrelevant").
In reviewing classifications that discriminate on the basis of sex, the Court requires the objec-
tives articulated by the legislature to be the actual purposes underlying the statute. See infra note
58 and accompanying text.
See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 670-723 & Supp. at 102-03; Wilkinson, supra note
23.
31. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
32. Although subsequent decisions produced more pronounced shifts of lasting consequence,
see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), Reed
was the first decision in which it was apparent that the Court had begun to accept gender as a
unique, or at least different, factor in equal protection analysis. See Gunther, supra note 23, at 24.
33. The Court has been unanimous injudgment only five times in approximately 20 sex dis-
crimination cases. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S.
76 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/6
Number 4] ADMISSION POLICY VIOLATION 1447
estates.34 Although the Court purported to apply the rational basis
standard" and expressly found the state's interest in eliminating in-
trafamily disputes legitimate,36 the ultimate rejection of the statutory
scheme indicated that a more exacting form of scrutiny had been
employed.37
(1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In those 20 cases, the Justices have submitted 56 sepa-
rate opinions.
The Court in Westcott was unanimous in finding that the statute violated the equal protection
clause, but split five-four on the question of extending benefits as a remedial order to cure the
constitutional defect. Federal courts invalidating federal legislation for underinclusiveness have
the choice of either rendering the statute unenforceable or extending it to cover those classes
improperly excluded. See Kanowitz, supra note 3, at 1413-23 (urging the use of judicial extension
of benign classifications to excluded men). See generally Ginsberg, Some Thoughts on Judicial
.4uthority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 301 (1979).
34. IDAHO CODE § 15-313 (1932) (current version at IDAHO CODE § 15-3-203 (1979)). This
section declared that "[o]f several persons claiming and equally entitled to administer, males must
be preferred to females .. "
35. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). The Court viewed the issue as "whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective
that is sought to be advanced by the operation" of the statutory classification. Id
The test the Court applied, however, was adopted from Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412,415 (1920) ("fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation"). 404 U.S. at 76.
36. The Court acknowledged that the statutory preference for males advanced the legitimate
state interest of reducing the workload of the probate courts by eliminating disputes between the
surviving parents, one class of particularly time-consuming issues. 404 U.S. at 76. Moreover, the
Court never challenged the State's premise that men are generally more knowledgeable about
business affairs than women. In light of these conclusions, the classification met the minimum
rationality test. See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 8; Gunther, supra note 23, at 34; Comment,
Single-Sex Public Schools: The Last Bastion of "Separate But Equal " 1977 DUKE L.J. 259, 261
nn.15-16.
37. The court struck down the statute as "the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbid-
den by the Equal Protection clause." 404 U.S. at 76. Thus, as Professor Gunther suggested, it
appeared that the presence of a sex-based classification prompted the Reed court to employ a
heightened level of scrutiny:
It is difficult to understand [the] result without an assumption that some special sensi-
tivity to sex as a classifying factor entered into the analysis. Clear priority classifications
are plainly relevant to the State's interest in reducing administrative disputes. Even if
the requirement be that the means bear a "significant relationship" to the state's purpose
the test would seem to have been met in Reed. Only by importing some special
suspicion of sex-related means from the new equal protection area can the result be
made entirely persuasive.
Gunther, supra note 23, at 34. Gunther labelled this ambiguous heightened standard, disguised by
the Court as minimal scrutiny, as "rationality with bite." Id Reaction to the Reed decision in
some circles was less than positive: "there is a real danger in the future that Reed will be used to
den)' the claims of women plaintiffs .... Reed reaffirms the heavy burden of proof that the
plaintiff must meet, and may well demonstrate that only in the most blatant cases will relief be
granted." Hodes, A DisgruntledLook at Reed v. Reed, 1 WOMEN'S RTs. L. RPrR. 9 (Spring 1972).
Most lower courts recognized that Reed was evidence of a developing shift by the Court. See,
e.g., Brennan v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir. 1973) (no longer to be
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The Court's departure from the minimal scrutiny standard for gen-
der-based classifications was explicitly effected in Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 3 in which four Justices treated sex as a "suspect class" entitled to
strict scrutiny.39 Four other Justices concurred in the judgment of the
Court,4" thereby striking down a federal statute requiring ser-
doubted that sex-based classifications are subject to scrutiny); Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225,
231 (4th Cir. 1973) (Reed represents some intermediate approach between rational basis and com-
pelling interest); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1973) (Reed calls for
a more vigorous review than the rational relationship test). But see Robinson v. Board of Regents,
475 F.2d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 1973) (Reed used traditional rational basis test).
38. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The complaint alleged that the classification violated the equal pro-
tection component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id at 680. See supra note
22.
39. 411 U.S. at 688. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion joined by Justices Douglas,
White and Marshall.
Justice Brennan rested his conclusion primarily on two factors, equally applicable to race-the
highly visible nature of the sex characteristic, and the fact that sex is an immutable characteristic
fixed at birth, yet unrelated to one's ability to perform or contribute to society. Id at 685-87.
In addition, the plurality, citing numerous examples of federal legislation aimed at elimination
of sex discrimination, argued that "Congress itself has concluded that classifications based on sex
are inherently invidious." Id at 687. The plurality also noted that women, like blacks, have
experienced notorious discrimination and that both have been excluded from the political process.
Id at 685-86. But see University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978) ("the percep-
tion of racial classification as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gen-
der-based classifications do not share."). For a brief discussion of the history of sex discrimination
and the Court's varying recognition of that legacy, see infra note 43.
A number of commentators have argued that sex shares the same essential characteristics as
race and should be accepted as a suspect class. See Gertner, Bakke on 4ffirmative Action for
Women: Pedestal or Cage, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173 (1979); Johnston & Knapp, Sex
Discrimination by Law- 4 Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 675 (1971); Lombard,
Sex.: A Classpcation in Search of Strict Scrutiny, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1355 (1975); Shaman, College
Admissions Policies Based on Sex and the Equal Protection Clause, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 609
(1971); Wasserstrom, Racisim, Sexism and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 581 (1977); Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standardfor Classifications Based on
Sex, 1975 DUKE L.J. 163; Note, supra note 28; Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection:
The Question ofa Suspect Class'ofcation, 5 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 1 (1977); Comment,
Waiting for Mr. Justice Powell The Supreme Court and Sex Based Discrimination, 5 CAP. U.L.
REV. 227 (1976); Comment, supra note 4. But see Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe Beneft
Programs, 65 VA. L. REV. 199, 205-11 (1979) (arguing that any analogy between race and sex for
constitutional purposes should be abandoned).
A few courts, prior to Frontiero, held sex to be a suspect class or advocated such an approach.
See, e.g., Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Robinson v. York,
281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968). Accord Sairer Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95
Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (sex found to be a suspect class under the California Constitution b the
same reasoning as used in Frontiero). Cf. Maxwell v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 30
Wash. App. 591, 636 P.2d 1102 (1981) (gender-based classifications suspect under the Washington
State constitution and subject to strict scrutiny).
40. Justice Stewart concurred on the basis of Reed, arguing that the statute worked invidious
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vicewomen, but not servicemen, to meet procedural and substantive re-
quirements to obtain dependents' benefits a.4  The concurring Justices
disapproved, however, of the plurality's treatment of sex as a suspect
class.42  The confusion resulting from the Court's use of conflicting
standards in Reed and Frontiero increased with its initial encounters
with benign43 sex discrimination in Kahn v. Shevin 4 and Schlesinger v.
discrimination. 411 U.S. at 691. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black-
mun, argued that it was unnecessary to decide if sex was a suspect classification, because Reed was
determinative. In addition, Justice Powell argued that finding sex to be a suspect class would
render the Equal Rights Amendment superfluous at a time when it was before the populace;
deference to the democratic process was, therefore, necessary. Id at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
41. 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1972), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2)(c) (1976), repealed by Defense
Officer Personnel Management Act, 95 Stat. 2835, 3877 (1980). The statute permitted a member of
the uniformed services--defined as the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard, Environ-
mental Science Service Administration and Public Health Service, 37 U.S.C. § 401(3); 10 U.S.C.
§ 1072(1) (1976), amended by Pub. L. 96-513 § 516(l)(A), 94 Stat. 2835-to obtain larger quarters
and greater medical benefits by claiming his wife as a dependent, without regard to whether she
was actually dependent on him for support.
A servicewoman, however, could only obtain similar benefits if her husband was in fact depen-
dent on her for over one-half of his support, 37 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1972); 10 U.S.C. § 1071(C) (1972).
411 U.S. at 178-79.
The plurality rejected the government's proferred justification of administrative convenience
and expense. 411 U.S. at 690. In addition to the fact that there was no "concrete" evidence that
the different treatment would save the government money, the plurality noted that the statute was
based on an impermissible conclusive presumption of dependence: "[T]hese statutes seize upon a
group-women-who have historically suffered discrimination in employment, and rely on the
effects of this past discrimination as a justification for heaping additional economic disadvan-
tages." Id at 689 n.22. The government's interest in "speed and efficiency" was therefore inap-
propriate under both strict scrutiny and the standard applied in Reed. Id at 690. Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting, agreed with the district court that the classification satisfied the Reed stan-
dard by rationally promoting the legitimate purpose of administrative convenience. Id at 691
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
42. Classifications that involve a suspect class or impinge on a fundamental right are subject
to the strict scrutiny test, which requires that the scheme be necessary to achieve a compelling
governmental interest. See supra note 23.
One commentator has described the application of this test as "strict in theory, fatal in fact."
Gunther, supra note 23, at 21. See also University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting).
43. The term "benign" denotes that the asserted purpose of the legislation is to compensate
for past discrimination. See supra note 3; see also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). Cf
University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) ("benign" used in context of racial
discrimination). For an analysis of the Court's differing treatment of benign racial and sexual
classifications, see Gertner, supra note 39, at 179-95.
The Court has acknowledged the legacy of sexual discrimination with varying degrees of sym-
pathy. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam) ("[r]eduction in the
disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of discrimi-
nation against women has been recognized as... an important governmental objective); Stanton
v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) ("in]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and
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Ballard.45
In Kahn, the Court rejected a challenge to a Florida statute granting
a property tax exemption to all widows but not to widowers. 6 Finding
that the financial difficulties confronting a widow greatly exceeded
those faced by a widower,47 the Court concluded that the unequal
treatment of the gender-based classes satisfied the "rationality with
the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and world of ideas"); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974) ("[w]hether from overt discrimination or from the socialization
process of a male dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any but
the lowest paid jobs"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) ("[t]here can be no doubt
that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination").
Discrimination against women has been, and to some degree still is, pervasive in our society.
See generally L. KANOWrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1-6 (1969).
Our common-law heritage viewed a woman's relationship to her husband as "something better
than a dog, a little dearer than his horse." A. TENNYSON, LOCKLEY HALL (1842), quoted in
Cavanagh, "4 Little Dearer than His Horse:" Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine Personaliy 6
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 260, 260 (1971). For a summary of economic, political, social, and legal
disadvantages suffered by women in American society, see generally B. BRowN, A. FREEDMAN,
H. KATZ & A. PRICE, supra note 28; E. FLEXNOR, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE (1959); L. GOLDSTEIN,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1979); L. KANOWITZ, supra, at 5-62; H. KAY, supra
note 12, at 1-12; THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCES ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES,
REPORT. A MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE (1970); Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 161-64; Johnston &
Knapp, supra note 39, at 731-37; Comment, supra note 4, at 603 n.93.
The discriminatory aspects of education have been subject to particular criticism:
The education system is at least in part responsible for limiting opportunities for women.
Everyday, female students in elementary and secondary schools are victimized by being
exposed to various degrees of subtle sex stereotyping as well as overt discrimination.
The continued use of sexually based textbooks, the practice of counseling young women
students to take traditionally "acceptable" courses within the regular academic and occu-
pational preparation curricula and similarly restrictive administrative policies which
limit female participation and involvement in extracurricular activities effectively serve
to limit women's perceptions of themselves.
14 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 1048 (1981). See generally L. BAKER, I'M RADCLIFFE! FLY ME
THE SEVEN SISTERS AND THE FAILURES OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION (1976); 2 T. WOODY, A HIS-
TORY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1929); Comment, supra note 4, at 600-07.
44. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
45. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
Between Kahn and Schlesinger, the Court decided Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In
Geduldi, the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a state disability insurance plan that
excluded pregnancy from its coverage. The majority found the statutory scheme constitutional
under the rational basis test, arguing that there was no gender-based discrimination because the
act differentiated between pregnant women and nonpregnantpersons. Id at 496 n,20. Justices
Brennan, Douglas and Marshall, in dissent, argued that the classification was inherently sex-based
and therefore subject to the strict scrutiny test. Id at 501, 503-04. See also Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
46. 416 U.S. at 353.
47. Id The Court relied extensively on statistics that demonstrated that women's median
earnings were substantially lower than men's earnings.
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bite" standard of Reed.48
In Schlesinger, the Court upheld a federal statute which mandated
the discharge of female naval officers who had twice failed to be pro-
moted after thirteen years, while requiring the discharge of similarly
situated male officers after only nine years.4 9 Finding that men and wo-
men line officers were not similarly situated with respect to career op-
portunities,5" the Court held that the additional time granted women in
the "up or out" scheme was rationally related to the legitimate govern-
mental objective of achieving fair and equitable career advancement
programs.5 '
Although the Court in both Kahn and Schlesinger purported to em-
ploy the calculus for sex-discrimination developed in Reed and Fron-
tiero, the majority in each case adopted a more deferential attitude
because remedial statutes were involved.52 The Court, therefore, ap-
plied a less rigorous equal protection standard when evaluating the va-
lidity of benign gender-based classifications that disadvantage men. 3
48. Id at 355. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Kahn, found that the legislation
was reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal
loss "upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden." Id at 355.
The majority opinion impliedly rejected the argument that the property-tax exemption was un-
related to any area in which women suffered discrimination, such as education, housing, financ-
ing, and public accommodations. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3-4, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974). This argument now commands a Court majority. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,284 (1979)
(Blackman, J., concurring).
The majority opinion in Kahn also evinces a great deference to taxing legislation. 416 U.S. at
355. Justice Brennan, in dissent, agreed that the ameliorative legislative purpose served a compel-
ling governmental interest, but focused on the overbreadth of the statute, which granted an ex-
emption to widows who had no need for financial support from the state. The majority refused to
address this argument. Id at 360. Justice White, also in dissent, applied the strict scrutiny test
and concluded that the statute served no compelling interest. Id at 361.
49. 10 U.S.C. §§ 6382, 6401 (1970). As in Frontiero, the complainant asserted the action
under the equal protection component of the fifth amendment. See supra note 22.
50. 419 U.S. at 508. The restrictions on women officers' participation in certain areas which
allegedly were the cause of diminished opportunities were not challenged. Id at 508. But see
Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978) (restrictions against women serving in Navy at
sea unconstitutional). See generally Erickson, supra note 28; Roberts, Gender-Based Draft Regis-
tration, Congressional Policy and Equal Protection: A Proposalfor a Deferential Middle-Tier Re-
Yiew, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 35 (1980); 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1371 (1982).
51. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Douglas dissented. They argued that the majority had
"conjured up" a legislative purpose that might conceivably have been Congress' intention but
which was nowhere reflected in the legislative history. 419 U.S. at 511. Such an objective, they
argued, fell far short of the compelling interest needed to satisfy the strict scrutiny test. Id at 520.
52. See supra notes 47-48 & 50-51 and accompanying text. See also infra note 57.
53. See generally Erickson, Kahn, Ballard & Wiesenfield: A New Equal Protection Test in
'Reverse" Sex Discrimination Cases?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1975); Ginsburg, Women, Equality
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In Weinberger v. Weisenfeld,5 4 however, the Court began a retreat
from a dual standard and appeared to move towards a single standard
of heightened scrutiny for all sex discrimination cases. In Weinberger,
the Court invalidated a provision of the Social Security Act that pro-
vided benefits to the wife and children of a deceased male, but pro-
vided similar benefits only to the children, and not the husband, of a
deceased female. The Court found that the Act discriminated against
women, and focused on the discriminatory impact on covered female
wage-earners rather than the palpably discriminatory effects on surviv-
ing male spouses.56 More importantly, after a detailed inquiry into the
legislative history, the Court rejected the Government's assertion that
the statute was originally designed to compensate women for past eco-
nomic discrimination. 57  This rejection reflected the Court's growing
insistence that any compensatory justification for discrimination be
andthe Bakke Case, 4 Civ. LIB. REV. 8 (1977); Ginsburg, supra note 41; Johnston, Sex Discrimina-
tion andthe Supreme Court, 1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 617 (1974); Note, suara note 39; Note,
Preferential Economic Treatment of Women: Some Constitutional and Practical Inmkolcations of
Kahn v. Shevin, 28 VAND. L. REv. 843 (1975). For a forceful argument that benign classifications
foster continued discrimination against men and should be an impermissible justification for sex
discrimination, see Kanowitz, supra note 3.
54. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). Between Schlesinger and Weinberger, the Court held that a state
statute providing an automatic exclusion for women from jury rosters violated the sixth amend-
ment, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), which effectively overruled Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57 (1961). See supra note 28.
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970 & Supp. 1972).
56. 420 U.S. at 645. See infra note 73. This is one of the few sex discrimination cases in
which the judgment of the Court was unanimous. See supra note 33.
The majority found the scheme essentially indistinguishable from that invalidated in Frontiero.
420 U.S. at 645. Both classifications were premised on "virtually identical 'archaic and overbroad'
generalizations. . . 'not tolerated under the Constitution.'" Id at 643 (quoting Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507 (1975)). In Frontiero, the Court claimed, the impermissible assumption
underlying the statute was that female spouses of servicemen were normally dependent upon their
husbands while the reverse was not true. 420 U.S. at 643. Here, the impermissible assumption
underlying the Social Security Act provision was that the earnings of a covered male worker were
vital to the support of the families, but the earnings of a covered female wage-earner did not
comprise a substantial contribution to the families' support. Id at 643. The Court concluded that
the statute therefore operated to "deprive women of protection for their families which men re-
ceive as a result of their employment." Id at 645. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
concurred, but viewed the classification as impermissibly discriminating against the female worker
because it provided her family with less protection. Id at 654 (Powell, J., concurring).
57. 420 U.S. at 653. The Court found that the provision itself and the legislative history
indicated that the true purpose of the statute was to permit women with minor children to elect
not to work in order to care for the children. Id at 648. The statute was therefore completely
irrational because a surviving father, no less than a surviving mother, could perform that function.
Id at 649-52. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (father has a constitutionally pro-
tected right to custody and management of children he sires and raises). Justice Rehnquist con-
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"genuinely rooted" in the actual legislative purpose,58 thereby limiting
the circumstances under which a remedial governmental purpose could
justify gender discrimination.59
An intermediate standard of scrutiny in equal protection analysis6 °
was finally confirmed in Craig v. Boren ,6' in which the Court acknowl-
edged that gender-based classifications were subject to a standard of
review more exacting than the rational basis test but less rigorous than
strict scrutiny.62  Although the majority did not explicitly recognize a
new standard of scrutiny, the Court, insisting that the case was con-
trolled by Reed,63 announced that "classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."'  Applying this standard to an
Oklahoma statute65 which set a higher age for men than women for the
curred in the result solely on this ground, finding it unnecessary to determine if the statute violated
the equal protection component of the fifth amendment. Id at 655. See supra note 22.
58. G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 791 n.2. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S.
464, 470 (1981); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 86 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
317 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212-13 (1977). See also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498, 512-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court must restrict its analysis to the
purposes that can be gleaned from the legislative history and not conjure up others).
59. See Baker, supra note 23, at 1089; Erickson, supra note 53, at 36; Note, The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 72, 179 (1977).
60. See supra notes 2 & 23 and accompanying text. See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975), in which the Court, relying on Reed, struck down a Utah statute that set different ages of
majority for men and women. Finding that the classification was based on outmoded notions and
stereotypes, id at 14-15, the Court concluded that the classification was unconstitutional under
strict scrutiny, the Reed formulation of minimal scrutiny, or "something in between." Id at 17.
61. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Although Craig set forth a new standard, the Justices wrote seven
opinions.
62. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
63. Throughout the majority opinion, Justice Brennan reiterated the Court's reliance on
Reed. 429 U.S. at 197, 198, 199, 200.
64. Id at 197. Other members of the Court and commentators recognized this formulation
as a new standard. See id at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring) ("our decision today will be viewed
by some as a 'middle-tier' approach"). See also Blattner, supra note 26, at 792; Ginsburg, supra
note 28, at 168; Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 54 (1977); Note,
Sexual Equality: Notfor Women Onl.; 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 427, 441 (1980); Note, The Supreme
Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 91, 161-62 (1981); Note, Supreme Court Review.- 1978-1979
Term, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 315, 443 (1980); Note, Broadening Access to the Courts and Clari-
fying Judicial Standards: Sex Discrimination Cases in the 1978-1979 Supreme Court Term, 14 U.
RICH. L. REv. 515, 565-66 (1980). See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 764-84.
65. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (1958 & Supp. 1976). This statute permitted women to
purchase 3.2% beer at the age of 18, but set the age of sale to men at 21.
This was the first time the Court struck down a gender-based law discriminating against men
under the equal protection clause. See also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (New York
law permitting unwed mother but not unwed father to prevent adoption of child violates equal
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purchase and consumption of 3.2% beer,66 the Court found that the
classification was not substantially related to the governmental interest
in protecting the public safety.67
In the context of benign discriminatory classifications, the Court ad-
hered to the Craig standard in Califano v. Goldfarb6' and Caiffano v.
Webster,69 companion cases involving equal protection challenges to
provisions of the Social Security Act.70 In Goldfarb, the Court set aside
a provision7 granting survivor benefits to women, but not to men with-
out an additional showing of financial dependency on the deceased
wife.72 As in Weinberger,73 the plurality7 4 focused on the Act's discrim-
inatory impact on women and found that the statute did not substan-
tially further any important governmental purpose.75 Justice Stevens
protection clause); Off v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama law providing that husbands but not
wives may be required to pay alimony on divorce violates equal protection clause).
66. 429 U.S. at 202-04. The Court also conducted a rigorous analysis of the statistical evi-
dence adduced by the State as justification for the statute, and concluded that it was methodologi-
cally suspect. Id at 204. The state's statistical evidence indicated that 2% of males and .18% of
females of the relevant age group were arrested for driving while intoxicated. Id at 201. The
Court rejected these statistics as providing "an unduly tenuous" basis on which to support a classi-
fication based on sex. Id at 202. Moreover, the Court expressed a general reluctance to rely on
statistics in these cases: "this merely illustrates that proving broad sociological propositions by
statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy
that underlies the Equal Protection Clause." Id at 204.
67. Id at 204. Although the Court accepted the state's asserted governmental purpose, it
noted that such a purpose was not apparent on the face of the statute nor in the scarce legislative
materials. Id at 199 n.7.
68. 430 U.S. 199 (1977). One commentator refered to this five-four decision as the "second
step in a litigation campaign aimed at advancing the Frontiera judgment and containing the Kahn
decision." See Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classfcation in the Context of Sex, 10 CONN.
L. REV. 813, 819 (1978).
69. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam).
70. See infra notes 71 & 79 and accompanying text.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1)(D) (1976).
72. 430 U.S. at 217.
73. Id at 203-06. The plurality in Goldfarb explicitly rejected the argument glossed over in
Weinberger, that the proper judicial focus should be the discriminatory impact on the male benefi-
ciary. The Court argued that the social security system is a form of insurance for the wage earner,
and the proper focus was thus on the individual denied the protection to which they had contrib-
uted, even though the entire family benefited from the system. Id at 208-09.
74. Justice Brennan wrote for the plurality, joined by Justices White, Marshall and Powell,
75. Id at 212-17. Relying again on Weinberger, the Court found that the asserted govern-
mental objective of providing independent widows with benefits to compensate for past job dis-
crimination against women was reflected neither on the face of the statute nor in the legislative
history. Id at 212-15. The Court then held, following Frontiero and Weinberger, that the pre-
sumption which served as the basis of the statute, that wives were dependent on their husband,
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argued that the provision actually discriminated against men,76 but
concurred in the judgment because the provision was merely the "acci-
dental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females," and
was therefore insufficient justification for the discrimination." Three
weeks later, however, the Court in Calfano v. Webster 78 upheld the
Act's use of a formula that granted women an advantage over men in
computing old-age benefits.79 In contrast to Goldfarb, the Court found
that the important governmental objective of compensating women for
past economic discrimination was amply reflected in the legislative his-
tory as the deliberate purpose of the provision. 0
In two recent equal protection cases, the Court appeared to attenuate
the degree of scrutiny imposed under the Craig test.' In Michael M. v.
Superior Court,8z the Court upheld California's gender-based statutory
rape law 3 under the Craig test,84 described by the plurality as a some-
what "sharper focus[ed]" minimum scrutiny standard.85 Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the plurality,86 argued that the statute justifiably
discriminated against men because the sexes were not similarly situated
was based on "archaic and overbroad" generalizations, and could not serve as a legitimate state
interest. Id at 217.
76. Id at 218. Justice Stevens also concurred in Craig on the grounds that the statute dis-
criminated against males. 429 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring). See supra notes 61-67 and
accompanying text.
77. 430 U.S. at 221-223. Justice Stevens also concluded that the decision in Weinberger effec-
tively overruled Kahn because it was unlikely that the state in Kahn could prove that a benign
purpose of the classification could be found in the legislative history. Id at 223-24. See supra
notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
78. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam).
79. Social Security Act § 215(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4115(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
80. 430 U.S. at 317. The Court concluded that the statutory scheme was therefore more
analogous to those upheld in Kahn and Ballard than to those invalidated in Weinberger and Gold-
farb. Id at 317. But 5f supra note 77. The Court also held that the provision "directly" compen-
sated women for past economic discrimination because retirement benefits paid to covered
workers were based on past earnings. Id at 318.
81. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 126-27 (Supp. 1982); Cassen, Equal Protection-Equal
Status: A Summary ofSex Discrimination Cases Since Frontiero, 11 LINCOLN L. REv. 167, 168
(1980); Dubnoff, Sex Discrimination and the Burger Court: A Retreat in Progress, 50 FORDHAm L.
REV. 369, 410-14 (1981).
82. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1981). This statute penalizes only males for en-
gaging in sexual intercourse with a female who is under the age of 18 and who is not the wife of
the male.
84. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
86. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Powell joined Justice Rehnquist.
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with respect to the state's objective of preventing teenage pregnancies.8 7
In Ros/ker v. Goldberg,88 the Court, upholding the male-only draft
registration requirements of the Military Selective Service Act,89 carved
out an exception to the heightened scrutiny mandated by Craig in the
exercise of Congress' military powers. 9° Arguing for the majority that
the degree and scope of judicial scrutiny was altered by the deference
traditionally paid Congress in military affairs, 91 Justice Rehnquist ap-
plied a standard less strict than the Craig standard but more exacting
87.
We need not be medical doctors to discern that young men and young women are not
similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse. Only
women may become pregnant, and they suffer disproportionately the profound physical,
emotional, and psychological consequences of sexual activity. The statute at issue here
protects women from sexual intercourse at an age when those consequences are particu-
larly severe.
450 U.S. at 471-72. Justice Rehnquist admitted that there was some question regarding the actual
intent behind the statute. Id at 469-70. He argued, however, that the state's asserted purpose was
entitled to deference, and that under Weinberger, the Court could reject professed justification
only if it "couldnot have been the goal of the legislation." 450 U.S. at 470 (quoting Weinberger v.
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16) (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist also argued that even if
the actual motive were the preservation of female chastity, an impermissible justification resting
on archaic stereotypes, 450 U.S. at 472 n.7, the statute would still be constitutional because "[i]t is
a familiar practice of constitutional law that this court will not strike down an otherwise constitu-
tional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." Id (quoting United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)).
The dissenters argued that the plurality and concurring Justices, in their rush to find the state's
asserted interest important, had misapplied the second half of the Craig test, which requires that
the means be substantially related to the ends. 450 U.S. at 488-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in response, noted that "[t]he question whether a statute is substantiaily related to
its asserted goals is at best an opaque one." Id at 474 n.10 (emphasis in original).
88. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
89. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (1976) (repealed in part §§ 452,457). The specific section chal-
lenged in Rosiker provided for the registration of every male citizen between the ages of 18 and
26. 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1976).
90. 453 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1981). Justice Rehnquist argued that a military-powers exception
already existed in some measure. Id at 67-72 (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)
(sex discrimination in military programs); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (same)).
See also United States v. Reiser, 532 F.2d 673 (9th Cir.) (rejecting equal protection challenge to
male-only draft registration using rational relation test), rev'g United States v. Reiser, 394 F.
Supp. 1060 (D. Mont. 1975) (holding all-male draft registration unconstitutional by application of
the strict scrutiny test), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976); Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp, 291
(D.D.C. 1978) (invalidating, on equal protection grounds, military policy banning assignment of
women to sea duty and rejecting assertion that Congress is owed great deference in all areas of
military affairs). See generally supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
91. 453 U.S. at 64-67. See generally Roberts, Gender Based Draft Registration, Congressional
Policy and EqualProltection: A Proposalfor DeferentialMiddle-Tier Review, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 35
(1980); Note, Women and the Draft: The Constitutionality of All-Male Registration, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 406 (1980); Comment, supra note 50.
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than the minimum rationality test urged by the Government.92 With
the exceptions of Michael M. and Rostker,93 however, the Court has
consistently applied the Craig standard to gender-based classifications
that discriminate against women or men for an allegedly compensatory
purpose.94
The Supreme Court has not given plenary consideration to the con-
stitutional issue engendered by sex-based discriminatory admissions
policies at public educational facilities;95 the Court has limited its prec-
92. 453 U.S. at 69. Justice Rehnquist sidestepped an explicit statement of a standard of re-
view, arguing that "any further 'refinement' in the applicable tests" would prove to be of little
value. Id at 69. He further argued that the equal protection analysis, with its "labels," "may all
too readily become facile abstractions used to justify a result." Id at 70.
93. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (Louisiana statute giving husband
exclusive right to dispose ofjointly owned property unconstitutional absent important governmen-
tal interest); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (Missouri worker's compen-
sation statute denying widower benefits on wife's work-related death unless physically or mentally
incapacitated or capable of proving dependence on wife's earnings, but granting widow death
benefits without proof of dependence discriminates against men and women alike and does not
serve important governmental objective of administrative convenience); Califano v. Westcott, 443
U.S. 76 (1979) (Social Security Act provision providing AFDC benefits to families with dependent
children who have been deprived of parental support because of father's unemployment, but not
providing benefits if mother is unemployed, not substantially related to achieving important gov-
ernmental objectives of providing aid to needy children and reducing incentive for fathers to
desert to make families eligible for assistance); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (New
York statute permitting unwed mother but not unwed father from preventing adoption of child by
withholding consent is not substantially related to any important governmental interest); Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama statute imposing alimony obligations on husbands but not
wives not substantially related to the governmental objective of compensating women for past
discrimination in marriage). But see Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (Georgia statute
permitting mother of an illegitimate child, but not father, to sue for wrongful death of child is not
individually discriminatory and is therefore subject to the rational relation standard, which it
meets). See also Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (Massachusetts statute granting
absolute lifetime civil service preference to veterans is not evaluated under gender-based discrimi-
nation standards despite the fact that the overwhelming number of veterans are male).
Gender-neutral classifications that have a disproportionately adverse impact on women must
reflect purposeful gender-based discrimination to be subject to "heightened scrutiny" under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272
(1982); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See generally Brest,
Reflections on Motive Review, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1141 (1978).
95. Admissions as well as other educational policies at public educational facilities are gov-
erned in large part by federal statutes. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), prohibits, with certain exceptions, gender-based
discriminatory policies in undergraduate, graduate, professional, and vocation schools. See supra
note 15. The Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980) may bar sex discrimination in public secondary and primary schools on the basis of sex.
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edential contribution to the summary affirmance of two federal court
decisions.96 A number of federal and state courts, however, have con-
fronted equal protection challenges to single-sex admissions policies.
These courts have consistently validated sexually segregated schools
when the state, on a system-wide basis; has provided equal educational
opportunities to members of the other sex in a similarly segregated
facility.97
See United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 560 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1977) (permanent policy
assigning students on basis of sex violates Act). But see Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880
(3d Cir. 1976), ae'd memr by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (Act does not apply
where record does not disclose inequality in opportunity between the sexes).
96. See supra note 95; Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D. S.C. 1970), aj'd, 401 U.S.
951 (1971). See infra note 98 and accompanying text. "[V]otes to affirm summarily, and to dis-
miss for want of a substantial federal question, it hardly needs comment, are votes on the merits of
a case. . . ." Ohio ex re. Easton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959), quoted in Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 322, 344 (1974). See generally C. WRIoHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COuRTS 495 (2d ed. 1970).
97. In Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), afl'd mem. by an equally
divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977), the Third Circuit held that an all-male public high school
violated neither the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment nor the provisions of the
Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974 if the female complainant had the opportunity to attend
a comparable all-female public high school. The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
summary affirmance of Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), ajl'd, 401 U.S. 951
(1971), which presented a very similar fact situation, and found that the sex-segregated admissions
policy satisfied either the minimal scrutiny or the substantial relationship test. 532 F.2d at 888.
The court concluded that the plaintiff's only real complaint, the personal inconvenience of being
unable to attend a specific school, was outweighed by the need for innovative methods and tech-
niques in education. Id
In Williams v. MeNair, a three-judge district court, relying on the Supreme Court's sex discrimi-
nation cases decided before Reed, rejected an equal protection attack on a statute that limited
admission to a state college to women. The district court concluded that an all-women's college
and an all-male college, maintained as part of a state system offering a variety of comparable
coeducational facilities, were not without rational educational and legal justification. 316 F. Supp.
at 137-38.
In Kirstein v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970), however, the court
found that the single-sex admission policy at the University of Virginia main campus violated the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause because there was no "equal" facility. Finding the
facility's resources and educational opportunities substantially superior to those offered at any
other state-supported facility, the district court concluded that the exclusionary policy was not
rational.
In Allred v. Heaton, 336 SAv.2d 251 (rex. Civ. App. writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 517
(1960), and in Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (rex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230
(1959), a state appellate court upheld the right of the state to maintain a separate all-male college
within a state-wide system that included an all-women's college and a variety of coeducational
facilities. In Bristol, which served as the basis for the subsequent decision in Allred, the court
characterized the nature of the plaintiff's injury as one of convenience. This, the court held, was
no different from the burden incurred by students who reside in towns miles distant from schools,
317 S.W.2d at 99. "The location of any such institution must necessarily inure to the benefit of
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In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,98 the Supreme Court
held that a state statute denying an otherwise qualified male the right to
enroll in a state-supported nursing program violates the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.9 9 Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, t°° began'01 by noting that "without question" the
State's admissions policy expressly discriminated on the basis of gender
because it imposed on Hogan "a burden he would not have to bear
were he female."'01 2 Therefore, the state bears the burden of proving an
"exceedingly persuasive justification"'' 0 3 for the sex-based classification
that can be met only by satisfying the heightened standard of scrutiny
established in Craig."4 This heightened level of scrutiny, she empha-
sized, applies with equal force to classifications that discriminate
some and to the detriment of others, depending on the distance the affected individuals reside
from the institution." Id at 99. The court held that the system offered ample and substantially
equal provisions for the education of both sexes without exalting either sex at the expense of the
other. Id at 99-100.
But see Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974), in
which the court of appeals struck down a school district's policy setting different standards for
admitting men and women to a high school. Using the strict scrutiny test of Frontiero, the court
rejected the school district's justification that the standards were set in order to maintain an equal
male/female ratio, finding that the evidence justifying such an educational policy was insubstan-
tial and proved nothing. Id at 1268-70.
Criticism of these "separate but equal" decisions rests on the argument that in education, sexu-
ally separate facilities, as with race, are inherently unequal. See generally H. KAY, supra note 28,
at 808; Freund, The Equal Rights.Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 234, 240
(1971); Hasgenski & Wechessee, The Case for Strictly Scrutinizing Gender Based Separate But
Equal Classification Schemes, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 439, 444-57 (1979); Johnston & Knapp, supra note
39, at 721-23; Sharman, supra note 39, at 611-18; Note, Toward a Red fnition of Sexual Equality,
95 HARV. L. REv. 487, 504-06 (1981); Comment, supra note 4, at 620-25.
98. 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982) (5-4 decision).
99. Id at 3340. See supra notes 6 & 23.
100. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice O'Connor.
101. At the beginning of her opinion, Justice O'Connor indicated that Mississippi maintains
no other single-sex public institution of higher education. 102 S. Ct. at 3334 n.l. She concluded,
therefore, that the Court was not faced with the question of "separate but equal" public institu-
tions for men and women. Id See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
102. Id at 3336 n.8 (quoting Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 273 (1979)). See supra note 10; infra
note 145 and accompanying text. Cf. Kirstein v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D.
Va. 1970) (state policy excluding women from University of Virginia unreasonably forced plain-
tiff, married to male student, to choose between an educational opportunity and family values).
103. 102 S. Ct. at 3336.
104. Justice O'Connor responded to the criticism of the dissenters that the use of heightened
scrutiny in this case was "rigid" and "productive of needless conformity" by arguing that the
Court's precedents clearly establish that the intermediate standard of scrutiny is invoked when-
ever an express, gender-based classification is involved, regardless of the gender allegedly suffer-
ing the discrimination. Id at 3336 n.9.
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against men as well as those that discriminate against women. °5 Addi-
tionally, Justice O'Connor cautioned that the important statutory ob-
jective required by the Craig test must be free from any archaic notions
or inaccurate assumptions about the proper roles of men and women in
society. 10 6
Under this analysis, the Court held the statutory policy unconstitu-
tional. Justice O'Connor rejected the state's assertion that the statute's
benign purpose to compensate women for past discrimination 0 7 was an
important governmental function. 0 8 She admitted that benign classifi-
105. Id at 3336. See supra note 104.
106. Justice O'Connor stated that the important statutory objective requirement invalidates
those objectives reflecting a paternalistic or protective attitude, based on the presumption that one
gender suffers from "an inherent handicap" or is "innately inferior." 102 S. Ct. at 3336. She cited,
as examples of statutes reflecting such archaic and stereotypic notions, the legislation involved in
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) and Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). See
supra note 28.
The Craig requirement that the means be directly and substantially related to the important
statutory objective embodies a similar requirement. "The purpose of requiring that close relation-
ship is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather
than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the
proper roles of men and women." 102 S. Ct. at 3337. An example of such an invalid relationship,
Justice O'Connor argued, was Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). Although the Stanton Court
invalidated a state statute which set the age of majority for men higher than for women, it did not
question the legitimacy or importance of the state interest in defining parent's obligations to sup-
port minor children. 102 S. Ct. at 3332 n.l . The Court found, however, that the relationship
between the objective and the classification was based on outdated and archaic stereotypes about
men's and women's roles in society. Id
107. The Court frankly admitted that the purpose was educational affirmative action for wo-
men. 102 S. Ct. at 3337-38.
108. Id at 3338-39. Citing Schlesinger as an example, Justice O'Connor conceded that "[i]n
limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it inten-
tionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened." Id at 3338.
The requirement that the aid must be deliberate is derived from Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975), see supra note 58 and accompanying text; the requirement that it be direct is
derived from Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
The State had originally argued that MUW's purpose was "to provide opportunities for women
which were not available to men." 102 S. Ct. at 3338 n.13. Drawing on a brief history of MUW
and women's education, Justice O'Connor claimed that "the impetus for founding MUW came
not from a desire to provide women with advantages superior to those offered men, but rather a
desire to provide white women in Mississippi access to state-supported higher learning." Id at
3338 n.13.
Justice O'Connor summarily dismissed a second objective, suggested by Justice Powell in dis-
sent, of providing women with a choice of educational environments. Id at 3340 n. 17. See ld at
3345-47. She stated:
Since any gender-based classification provides one class a benefit or choice not available
to the other class, however, that argument begs the question. The issue is not whether
the benefited class profits from the classification, but whether the State's decision to con-
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cations could serve important statutory objectives, but the state must
show that the classification was adopted intentionally to further a com-
pensatory purpose. 19 In addition, the classification must benefit those
members of the sex which actually suffer a disadvantage related to the
classification. 10
The Court found that neither criterion was satisfied. Justice
O'Connor argued that the state failed to show that women faced dis-
criminatory barriers or lacked opportunities in the field of nursing; 1 ,
in fact, women have traditionally dominated the profession." 2 There-
fore, the benign statutory objective tended to "perpetuate the ster-
otyp[ic] view of nursing as an exclusively women's job."' '1
The majority also rejected the assertion, raised in Justice Powel's
dissent, that the state policy served important governmental objectives
by giving women an additional choice of educational environments.' 14
This argument, Justice O'Connor countered, simply "begs the ques-
tion" because all gender-based classifications provide one sex addi-
tional benefits or opportunities." 5  The crucial question was whether
fer a benefit only upon one class by means of a discriminatory classification is substan-
tially related to achieving a legitimate and substantial goal.
Id at 3340 n.17.
109. The compensatory-purpose requirement was first articulated by the Court in Weinberger.
See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor added that this "same searching
analysis" is used regardless of whether the statutory objective is that raised in Reed (to eliminate
family disputes), or in Frondero (administrative efficiency), or where the purpose is benign. 102 S.
Ct. at 3338. She therefore implied that the Weinberger doctrine will be applied to all cases of sex
discrimination, regardless of asserted purpose.
110. This requirement was expressed in Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). See supra
notes 78-80 and accompanying text. Examples of classifications which met this requirement were
those involved in Webster and Schlesinger. See supra notes 49-51 & 78-80 and accompanying text.
111. 102 S. Ct. at 3339.
112. Id Statistics cited by the Court attested to the dominance of women in the field of nurs-
ing at the time MUW's nursing program was founded and at the present time.
Justice O'Connor pointed out that some nursing officials believe that the absence of men in the
field had artificially depressed wages. Id at 3339 n.15. To the extent this is true, she concluded,
the exclusionary admissions policy actually penalized the class it sought to benefit. Id Classifica-
tions in Weinberger, Goldfarb and Wengler were struck down by the Court for that reason. See
supra notes 71-77 & 94.
113. 102 S. Ct. at 3339. Justice O'Connor argued that even if women had been subject to past
discrimination in nursing, the state failed to show that educational affirmative action was the
purpose behind the policy. Id at 3339 n.16. Justice O'Connor adverted to MUW's charter as
evidence of a contrary legislative purpose. Id
114. Id at 3340 n.17.
115. Id
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that goal was "legitimate and substantial." '" 6
The majority buttressed its conclusion by finding that the classifica-
tion was not directly and substantially related to the alleged objec-
tive.'1 7 The university policy permitting men to audit nursing school
classes,"' in addition to testimony by university personnel that the
presence of men did not adversely affect women students,' '9 convinced
the Court that the exclusionary admissions policy was not necessary to
achieve any educational goal. 2 '
Finally, the majority addressed the state's contention that the single-
sex program was specifically authorized by section 901 (a)(5) of Title IX
of the Educational Amendments of 1972, which exempts traditionally
single-sex institutions from Title IX's general proscription against dis-
crimination in educational institutions.' 2 ' Putting aside strong doubts
that Congress intended to exempt MUW from any constitutional provi-
sion, 22 the Court stated that "[e]ven if Congress envisioned a constitu-
tional exemption, the state's argument would fail."' 12 3  The Court
acknowledged that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, 24 under
which Title IX was enacted, gave Congress broad powers to enforce the
guarantees and rights enumerated in the other provisions of that
amendment. 25  The majority concluded, however, that congressional
116. Id Justice Powell responded this was not the issue because the respondent, Hogan, was
not complaining about any benefit conferred on women not similarly conferred on men-namely,
the right to attend a state nursing school or the right to attend an all-male college. All Hogan
desired, he argued, was to attend a specjfc state college, which presented only a claim of personal
convenience. Id at 3342 (Powell, J., dissenting).
117. Id at 3339.
118. See supra note 9.
119. 102 S. Ct. at 3340.
120. Id at 3339.
121. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, § 901(a)(5), 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (1976
& Supp. IV 1980), states that "in regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any public
institution of undergraduate higher education which is an institution that traditionally and contin-
ually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students of one sex." See supra
note 18.
The House version would have extended the prohibition to all educational institutions, includ-
ing primary and secondary schools. 118 CONG. REc. 5804 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). The
Senate version excluded primary and secondary schools because no statistics were available to
indicate the number of single-sex elementary and secondary schools. Id
122. "Rather, Congress apparently intended, at most, to exempt MUW from the requirements
of Title IX." 102 S. Ct. at 3340.
123. Id
124. U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 5: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."
125. 102 S. Ct. at 3340.
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power under section 5 is restricted to measures that enforce the guaran-
tees of the amendment; 26 it grants neither Congress nor the states the
power "to validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment."' 27
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, argued that the majority's decision
was limited to a professional nursing school, and suggested that the
court might sanction all-women's programs in areas where women
have not statistically dominated.128
Justice Blackmun, also dissenting, argued that the majority had inap-
propriately applied the Craig test' 29 because it was not simply Hogan's
maleness which prevented him from obtaining the additional education
and degree sought.130  Moreover, Justice Blackmun doubted that the
Court's ruling could be narrowly restricted' 3 ' and suggested that its
reasoning would inexorably condemn any state-supported educational
institution which was wholly or partially sexually segregated.132
Justice Powell's dissent advanced these themes in greater detail. He
argued that the Court misapplied the heightened standard of scrutiny,
developed for cases "of genuine sexual stereotyping," 133 to a narrow
classification that provided women with an additional choice 34 "that
126. An example of one such measure, the Court noted, is "to secure to all persons the enjoy-
ment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or
invasion." d at 3340 (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
127. 102 S. Ct. at 334041. "§ 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate or dilute these
guarantees." Id at 3340 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966)). See also
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 100 (1970).
128. The Chief Justice suggested that a state might be justified in maintaining an all-woman's
business school or liberal arts program. 102 S. Ct. at 3341 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See infra
note 180.
129. I have come to suspect that it is easy to go too far with rigid rules in this area of
claimed sex discrimination, and to lose-indeed destroy-values that mean much to
some people by forbidding the State from offering them a choice while not depriving
others of an alternate choice.
Id at 3341 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Mississippi ... has not closed the doors of its educa-
tional system to males like Hogan. Assuming that he is qualified. . . those doors are open and his
maleness alone does not prevent his gaining the additional education he professes to seek." Id
See infra note 144.
131. Justice Blackmun projected an "inevitable spillover" from the Court's ruling. Id (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
132. Id at 334142 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Id at 3342 (Powell, J., dissenting).
134. "In no previous case have we applied [the intermediate equal protection standard] to
invalidate state efforts to expand women's choices. Nor are there prior sex discrimination deci-
sions by this Court in which a male plaintiff, as in this case, had the choice of an equal benefit."
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discriminates invidiously against no one."'t35  Because the petitioner
did not present a "serious equal protection claim of sex discrimina-
tion,"' 36 the lowest tier of scrutiny was appropriate.
37
Justice Powell argued, alternatively, that even if the Craig standard
was appropriate, the exclusionary admissions policy was constitu-
tional. 38 Acknowledging that there were differing views on the merits
of single-sex education,' 39 Justice Powell urged that the state's interest
in providing women with a voluntary, traditional educational choice t40
was "legitimate and substantial."'' He also found the policy substan-
Id at 3344 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Powell perceived the additional
choice as the option of attending an all-woman's school. See infra notes 140-41.
135. 102 S. Ct. at 3346 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell argued that providing a choice
between coeducational and single-sex systems "exalts neither sex at the expense of the other, but
to the contrary recognizes the equal rights of both sexes to the benefit of the best, most varied
system of higher education that the State can supply." Id at n.12 (quoting Heaton v. Bristol, 317
S.W.2d 86, 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959), quoted in Williams v.
McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 138 n.15 (D. S.C. 1970)).
136. 102 S. Ct. at 3345-46 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell emphasized that the only
injury Hogan suffered was one of inconvenience. "His constitutional complaint is based upon a
single asserted harm: that he must travel to attend the state-supported nursing schools that con-
cededly are available to him." Id at 3342 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell pointed out that the Court had come to regard women as the victims of this
admissions policy because of the stereotyped perception it fostered and maintained in society. Id
at 3345 (Powell, J., dissenting). Yet, he argued, not one woman complained; in fact, the only
complainant was one man who advanced no claim on behalf of anyone other than himself. Id
Treating this as a case of sex discrimination and applying heightened scrutiny "frustrates the
liberating spirit of the Equal Protection Clause." Id But cf. Califano v. Goldfirb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977) (act imposing procedural and substantive requirements on surviving male spouse to obtain
death benefits, not similarly imposed on surviving female spouse, deprives female spouse of equal
protection); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (act providing death benefits to surviv-
ing female spouse and dependent child but only to dependent child and not surviving male spouse
unjustifiably discriminates against female covered wage earners). See supra notes 57 & 75 and
accompanying text.
137. 102 S. Ct. at 3346 (Powell, J., dissenting).
138. Id at 3346 (Powell, J., dissenting).
139. Id at 3343 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell went only so far as to say that single-
sex education has "arguable" benefits.
For a discussion of the benefits and detriments of single-sex schools, see generally A. ASTIN,
FOUR CRITICAL YEARS (1977); B. BABCOCK, A. FRIEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEx DISCRIM-
INATION AND THE LAW (1975); THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, OPPORTU-
NITIES FOR WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1973).
140. "The sexual segregation of students has been a reflection of, rather than an imposition
upon, the preference of those subject to the policy." 102 S. Ct. at 3343 (Powell, J., dissenting),
141. Justice Powell argued that although single-sex education is not the favored form today, it
is not legally illegitimate, and the state's interest in providing that choice can be substantial. Id at
3346 (Powell, J., dissenting). "mhe Constitution does not require that a classification keep
abreast of the latest in educational opinion, especially when there remains a respectable opinion to
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tially related to "long-respected" state objectives and dismissed the
small number of men who had audited nursing school courses over the
years as an "insubstantial" deviation from a perfect means-end
relationship.' 42
The decision in Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan143 reveals
that the members of the Court are still in serious disagreement over
some basic issues. The Court was clearly correct in finding that the
state admissions policy discriminated among applicants on the basis of
sex, 44 because it imposed a disadvantage on Hogan he would not have
suffered were he a similarly situated female. 145 Although Justice Pow-
ell correctly observed that this scheme simply provided women with an
additional benefit," the policy nevertheless discriminated against men
by providing women with a more valuable opportunity than it pro-
vided men.147
Justice Powell argued against the application of heightened scrutiny
the contrary .... Any other rule would mean that courts and not legislatures would determine
all matters of public policy. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D.S.C. 1970), a 'dmem.,
401 U.S. 951 (1971)." 102 S. Ct. at 3344 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell also disagreed with the Court's assertion that MUW's admissions policy perpe-
trated a stereotypic view of women. See id at 3339. He reasoned that because the nursing pro-
gram was instituted almost a century after MUW was founded, and almost a decade after a
coeducational state nursing program was founded, it was not logical to link the single-sex admis-
sion policy with a stereotypic view of nursing as a women's profession. Id at 3346 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Id at 3347 (Powell, J., dissenting).
142. 102 S. Ct. at 3347 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell claimed that it was "understand-
able" that the University might believe that the presence of auditing men would not materially
affect the educational environment. Id at 3347 n.17.
143. Id at 3331.
144. Id at 3336. Justice Powell is correct that travel is a factor that enters into the discrimina-
tory calculus. Males located near one of the coeducational nursing programs will not face the
unenviable choice Hogan did. That, however, does not adequately explain why, or when, a classi-
fication that discriminates on the basis of gender as well as other non-"suspect" factors should or
should not be reviewed under a heightened standard of scrutiny.
145. 102 S. Ct. at 3336 n.8.
146. Id at 3342 (Powell, J., dissenting).
147. To deny that a policy is discriminatory when it provides one group with an opportunity
not available to another is disingenuous; to insist that not every policy which entails some form of
gender discrimination should be subjected to a stricter form of scrutiny is to continue the debate
begun in Reed v. Reed. See infra note 151.
To provide for the general case, it is more accurate to say that the policy provides women with
an opportunity that couldbe of value. Depending on the factual circumstances-presumably, the
most important factor would be the distance a person was from the sexually segregated facility
and a coeducational facility--the opportunity could be of considerable value, as it would be to a
male in Hogan's position, or of no more value than that inherent in an additional opportunity
itself.
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because "the only complainant is a man who advances no claims on
behalf of anyone else,"' 148 and further, because Hogan was not denied
any substantive right, but suffered only an inconvenience. 49 This ar-
gument suggests either that Hogan does not deserve protection under
the fourteenth amendment because his claim of sex discrimination was
individual,'50 or that the de minimus injury he suffered did not seri-
ously infringe any right. 5'
Having found discrimination on the basis of sex, the Court correctly
applied the Craig test as it had applied the test to classifications dis-
criminating between men and women prior to Michael M and
Rostker.'52 The Court's straight-forward-almost wooden-applica-
tion of the Craig test, 53 without regard to which sex was suffering dis-
crimination, 54 should belie concerns raised by the decisions in Michael
M. and Rostker, and add a welcome degree of certainty to this area of
constitutional law.' 55 The Court may have done more than simply re-
affirm the vitality of the Craig test, however; it appears to have elevated
the intermediate standard of review for gender-based classifications
closer to the level of strict scrutiny. This conclusion is manifested by
the Court's rejection of the two proferred state objectives,-educational
affirmative action"56 and educational choice for women'' 57-further re-
148" Id at 3345. See also id at 3342 ("case instituted by one man, who represents no class").
149. Id See also id at 3342 ("primary concern is personal convenience"); id at 3342 ("[a]
constitutional case is held to exist solely because one man found it inconvenient to travel to any of
the other institutions made available to him by the State of Mississippi").
150. Butcf Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90
(1978) (strict scrutiny appropriate for review of claims by white male of race discrimination be-
cause "[it is settled beyond question that the 'rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual.... The rights established are per-
sonal rights.' ").
151. See supra notes 130 & 133-35 and accompanying text. Cf. Appleton, Beyond the Limits of
Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental.Rights
Analysis andro the Wefare Thesis 81 COLUM. L. REv. 721, 746-53 (1981) (arguing that within the
context of fundamental due process cases, the Court has begun to treat "impingement," which it
once viewed merely as a synonym for state action, as a "discrete substantive requirement" to be
satisfied before strict judicial scrutiny will be invoked).
152. See supra notes 93-94. See also supra notes 82-87 & 88-92.
153. 102 S. Ct. at 3337.
154. Id
155. See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text. At least one court has cited Missssivpi
Universityfor Women as employing the proper intermediate standard of review for gender-based
classifications. See O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 545 F. Supp. 376, 378 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
156. 102 S. Ct. at 3337-38. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
157. 102 S. Ct. at 3340 n.17. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
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stricting the range of remedial and nonremedial governmental objec-
tives that are sufficiently "important" to meet the Craig test.
The Court's rejection of the state's contention that the admissions
policy served a remedial purpose reflects more than an increased insis-
tence on narrowly defined benign objectives: it's reasoning would ap-
pear to require that the benign purpose be advanced by the narrowest
classification practicable.158 The Court, therefore, rejected as overly
broad the state's asserted interest in providing educational affirmative
action for women in the form of an all-women's university; instead, the
Court required that the state's interest be advanced by the narrower
class of women pursuing a professional degree in nursing school. 15 9
Because women have never suffered discrimination in the field of nurs-
ing, the classification served no compensatory interest.'60
The Court also implicitly rejected the state's second objective, pro-
viding women with the opportunity to attend a single-sex institution, as
an important, nonremedial governmental purpose.16' This conclusion
is a further indication that only unique nonremedial objectives satisfy
the importance requirement under the Craig test. 62 The Court, there-
fore, appears to be transforming the Craig test into one that is "[inter-
mediate] in scrutiny, fatal in fact."' 63
The most important aspect of this decision may be the Court's dispo-
sition of MUW's contention that the admissions policy was sanctioned
by Title IX, pursuant to the congressional enforcement power under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,'"
158. 102 S. Ct. at 3338-39. See supra notes 110 & 112. The Court also requires that the classi-
fication compensate a class that, on the basis of statistical evidence, has actually suffered a disad-
vantage. Id Benign, compensatory objectives must now pass an initial test similar to the converse
of the least-restrictive alternative doctrine. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
159. 102 S. Ct. at 3337-38. "The State's primary justification for maintaining the single-sex
admissions policy of MUW's School of Nursing is that it compensates for discrimination against
women and, therefore, constitutes educational affirmative action .... As applied to the School of
Nursing, we find the State's argument unpersuasive." Id (emphasis added).
160. Id at 3339. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
161. Id at 3340 n.17. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
162. Since the Craig decision, the Court has upheld only two legislative classifications that did
not have benign rationales. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1980); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 458 U.S. 57 (1981). See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. Both cases involved
legislative purposes that can be fairly called unique: the prevention of teenage pregnancy in
MichaelM and military preparedness in Rostker. Neither case was cited by any opinion in Mis-
sissppi University for Women.
163. Gunther, supra note 23, at 8. See supra note 23.
164. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In Morgan, the Court upheld section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act
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the Court suggested that Congress, under section 5, possesses some
power to define the substantive content of fourteenth amendment
rights.161 Justice Brennan, responding to concerns that this power
could be used to restrict, as well as expand, constitutional guaran-
tees, 166 stated that section 5 empowered Congress only to "enforce" the
amendment's guarantees. 67 Measures that dilute or derogate constitu-
tional guarantees were therefore not permissible. 68  Laws that extend
fourteenth amendment rights beyond the constitutional scope defined
by the Court were, nevertheless, a valid exercise of legislative power. 69
The Court's argument that Congress could only "rachet up" consti-
tutional rights has provoked considerable commentary which has cast
doubt on the theory's continued validity.' 70 InMississopi Universityfor
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1976), which prohibited the states from using an English literacy
requirement to deny the right to vote to persons educated in American schools in which the pri-
mary language spoken was other than English. 384 U.S. 641, 643 n.l (1966). The statute primar-
ily benefited Spanish-speaking New York residents educated in Puerto Rico. Zd at 652.
The Court in Morgan concluded that Congress' power under section 5 was not dependent on a
judicial determination that a statute violated the fourteenth amendment because such dependence
"would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for imple-
menting the Amendment." Id at 648. The Court posited two rationales for section 4(e), either of
which it indicated was sufficient to support congressional action. The Court first noted that sec-
tion 4(e) might rest on a congressional determination that the invalidation of the state law was
necessary to inhibit conduct that the Court had declared in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id at 652. Second, the Court hypothesized a congressional finding that the state law re-
quiring literacy qualifications itself violated the equal protection clause. Id at 654-56. The Court
thus indicated that Congress had some independent power to interpret the Constitution, to which
the Court would defer if it "perceived a basis." This deference was based on the Court's recogni-
tion of Congress' special institutional competence to investigate, determine and weigh legislative
facts. See Note, Congressional Power to Enforce Due Process Rights, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1265,
1268-71 (1980); 25 STAN. L. REv. 885, 889-91 (1973).
165. 384 U.S. at 651, 653; id at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at
1059-60; Note, supra note 164, at 1272. See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 205 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
167. Id at 651 n.10.
168. Id See Note, supra note 164, at 1275.
169. G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 1060; Note, supra note 164, at 1268, 1276. See also Cohen,
Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603, 606-07
(1975); 25 STAN. L. REv., supra note 164, at 885.
170. Commentators have argued that the deference paid to Congress because of its institu-
tional factfinding capacity does not square with the uni-directional limitation of the ratchet the-
ory. If congressional findings are virtually conclusive to support an expansive application of the
fourteenth amendment, they should be given equal weight when they restrict rights which the
Court has held to be protected. Note, supra note 164, at 1276. Other commentators have argued
that permitting Congress to define the scope of constitutional rights based upon superior factfind-
ing ability drastically alters the principles governing the relationship between the legislature and
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Women, however, a majority of the Court explicitly relied on the ratch-
et theory in dismissing the state's defense under Title IX.I7' The Court
concluded that "[a]lthough we give deference to congressional deci-
sions and classifications, neither Congress nor a State can validate a
law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." '172 Although the Court appears to have settled a constitutional
controversy by placing definitive limits on congressional power, its
summary treatment of this issue is troubling. First, given the degree of
controversy this question has spawned, the Court's abbreviated treat-
ment of the issues involved is startling.'73 Second, the dissenters did
not address this segment of the Court's decision, a significant fact be-
cause a number of those Justices have previously expressed disagree-
ment with the doctrine that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment
gives Congress any "substantive" power to expand or contract constitu-
tional rights. 74 It is possible that the dissenters, contending that the
admissions policy did not violate the equal protection clause, found it
unnecessary to reach this issue, thereby attempting to limit the prece-
dential value of this aspect of the Court's decision by ignoring it.
It is likely, as the dissenting opinions forcefully illustrate, that the
decision in Mississippi University for Women cannot easily be con-
tained, despite the protestations of the majority. 7 5 Given the Court's
assumption that sex-based classifications can escape heightened scru-
tiny only by achieving exact parity between the sexes,176 and in light of
the judiciary articulated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 737 (1803). See G. GUNTHER,
supra note 4, at 1086; Burt, Miranda and Title II" 4 Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81,
84. See general y L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-14 (1978); Burt, supra at 105-
08; Cohen, supra note 6, at 613-17; Cox, Supreme Court-1965 Tern--Foreward Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 118 (1966); Gordon, The
Nature and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to Over-
come Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 656, 671-72 (1977); Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Under-enforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1231-32 (1978);
Note, supra note 164, at 1275-77.
171. 102 S. Ct. at 3340. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
172. 102 S. Ct. at 3340.
173. The circuit court dismissed the argument with greater dispatch than that managed by the
Supreme Court, finding it unnecessary to cite even one case. 653 F.2d 222, 223 (5th Cir. 1981). See
supra note 18.
174. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 296 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stewart, who joined Justice Harlan's dissent in Morgan, was joined in
Mitchell by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun.
175. 102 S. Ct. at 3341-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id at 3347 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
176. The requirement of exact parity of opportunity, benefit, or burden is the crux of the
debate between Justice Powell and the majority. To Justice Powell, the determinative question is
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the Court's rejection of single-sex education as an important govern-
mental objective, 177 at least where no separate but equal facility exists,
all public single-sex schools are likely to be constitutionally prohibited.
Arguably, the decision condemns even "separate but equal"'' 78 facilities
because some students will always be burdened by being forced to
travel to a school reserved for their sex when an equal. facility for the
opposite sex is closer.
The immediate implication for public single-sex education is clear;
men must be admitted to programs traditionally dominated by wo-
men. 79  MUW, however, has already surrendered to the Court's im-
plicit condemnation of all single-sex programs; in September 1982, the
University admitted sixty-five men to its freshman class.'8 0
The decision in Mississipi University for Women is significant be-
cause the Court directly addressed two important constitutional con-
cerns: the vitality and strength of the Craig test and the limits of
congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
The decision, however, also highlights the need for a definition of sex-
ual equality to guide the courts in applying constitutional standards to
sex-based classifications.1 8' The reaffirmance of the Craig test and the
not whether a disparity exists, reflecting some sort of burden on an individual, but whether that
burden is of sufficient significance to trigger a heightened standard of scrutiny. See supra notes
146-51 and accompanying text.
177. 102 S. Ct. at 3340 n.17.
178. See su.pra notes 95-97 & 101 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
180. Over 130 men have enrolled at MUW for the Fall 1982 semester in the following under-
graduate programs: I I in the Division of Nursing; 9 in the Division of Human Behavioral Sci-
ences (Psychology, Sociai Work); 2 in the Division of Humanities (English, Foreign Languages,
History, Philosophy, Religion); 40 in the Division of Business and Economics; 0 in the Division of
Home Economics; 5 in the Division of Sciences and Mathematics; 6 in the Division of Fine and
Peforming Arts; 0 in the Division of Health, Physical Education and Recreation; 5 in the Division
of Communications; 3 in the Division of Education; 41 undeclared. Three men are also enrolled
in graduate programs in the College of Arts and Sciences. Telephone interview with Cynthia
Shakleford, Assistant Director of Public Information at Mississippi University for Women (Octo-
ber 15, 1982).
181. Although the Court articulated a standard of review in [Craig]--the disputed statu-
tory classification must have a substantial relationship to an important governmental
objective--its application of this standard has been rudderless. Whether a relationship is
"substantial" or an objective "important" within the meaning of the equal protection
clause depends on the ultimate goal of that inquiry, yet the Court has never clearly
enunciated this goal.
Comment, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1, 173 (1981). See generally Baker,
supra note 23; Westen, he Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982); Note, To ward a
Redtnitlon of Sexuality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 487 (1981).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss4/6
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apparent effort to induce a stricter intermediate scrutiny may serve to
bring about less qualitative inequality between the sexes. The Court,
however, still does not tell us what equality between the sexes means in
a constitutional system that permits some distinctions on the basis of
sex. Without a clear definition, the Court is forced to adhere to a facile
phrase that merely states a conclusion, but does little to aid analysis.
Significant and continued division in the Court remains in all but the
most straightforward cases. 182
PL.Y
182. Baker, supra note 23, at 1029. See supra note 23.
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